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The Unbearable Lightness of Monitoring: Direct
Monitoring in BitTorrent
Tom Chothia, Marco Cova, Chris Novakovic, and Camilo Gonza´lez Toro
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract. It is known that BitTorrent file-sharing traffic is analysed to
identify exchangers of copyrighted material. In general, copyright holders
can perform monitoring using two approaches: indirect monitoring, where
indirect clues of the sharing activity of a peer are considered (e.g., its
presence in the peer list of a tracker), and direct monitoring, which estab-
lishes connections with peers to estimate their participation in sharing ac-
tivity. Previous research has focused exclusively on indirect monitoring.
We provide a broader characterisation of the monitoring of BitTorrent
activity by considering both indirect and direct monitoring. In particu-
lar, we review previous work on indirect monitoring, provide features to
detect peers engaged in such monitoring, and apply them to identify a
number of monitoring organisations. Additionally, we introduce features
that detect direct monitors, and provide the first ever measurements of
direct monitoring, showing that it is now occurring.
Key words: BitTorrent, P2P monitoring, copyright enforcement
1 Introduction
BitTorrent is a decentralised peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol designed for the effi-
cient transfer of large files. It is used by millions of users, contributing signifi-
cantly to the volume of global Internet traffic [19]. BitTorrent users exchange a
range of legal content: many Linux distributions rely on BitTorrent as a content
delivery mechanism, and video game companies use it to provide updates and
patches to their customers [2]. However, BitTorrent is also widely used (over-
whelmingly so, according to one study [11]) for the illegal exchange of copy-
righted material, such as music, movies and software.
Many copyright holders perceive this illegal exchange of content as a threat
to their business models and have increasingly sought to prevent it. In particular,
copyright holders are known to routinely monitor file-sharers, collect evidence of
infringement, issue cease-and-desist letters and, in some cases, demand financial
compensation from the users they deem to have infringed their copyright [8]. The
task of policing BitTorrent is often outsourced to specialist copyright enforcement
agencies.
One key aspect of BitTorrent monitoring is the precise set of techniques
employed by enforcement agencies, which have never been disclosed publicly; in
fact, the companies involved appear keen to avoid having their evidence being
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Fig. 1. Different methods by which a monitoring peer (PM ) may monitor a regular
peer (PR) via a tracker (T ). From left to right: indirect monitoring; passive direct
monitoring; active direct monitoring.
examined in court [8]. Nevertheless, two general approaches are possible: indirect
and direct monitoring [17].
With indirect monitoring, enforcement agencies rely on indirect clues that
a peer is uploading or downloading some content (i.e., by the presence of the
peer’s IP address in the group, or swarm, of peers reported by a BitTorrent
tracker to be sharing the file — see Figure 1). A 2008 study by Piatek et al. [17]
showed that indirect monitoring was extensively used by enforcement agencies.
The study also demonstrated the high rate of false positives caused by this
approach by implicating innocent devices such as printers and wireless access
points as file-sharers, which later received cease-and-desist letters. More recent
studies have confirmed that these flawed practices continue to be used [6, 18].
With direct monitoring, enforcement agencies collect first-hand evidence of
a peer’s activity. Direct monitoring can be active if the monitor establishes
connections with peers to confirm that they are sharing a file, or passive if
the monitor advertises its IP address to a tracker and waits for peers to connect
to it (see Figure 1). Clearly, direct monitoring techniques have the potential to
gather more conclusive evidence, but are also costlier (in terms of bandwidth and
computational resources) when compared with indirect techniques; methods of
improving the efficiency of direct monitoring have been proposed [1]. Documents
recently filed in a New York Southern District Court case imply that at least one
copyright enforcement agency is using some form of direct monitoring to collect
its evidence against file-sharers [15]; however, at this time it is not clear whether
comprehensive direct monitoring is in widespread use.
The goal of this work is to characterise the current state of BitTorrent moni-
toring by investigating it from several points of view. Firstly, we review indirect
monitoring and assess various features to detect peers that are engaged in this
activity (how can indirect monitoring be detected?). Secondly, we focus on direct
monitoring and study its characteristics. The occurrence of this type of moni-
toring has not been studied before; thus, we want to introduce features to detect
peers engaging in direct monitoring (how can direct monitoring be detected?), as
well as investigate its mechanics (how is direct monitoring performed?). Thirdly,
we assess whether the information gathered by monitoring agencies is accurate
and conclusive (what information is really collected?). Finally, we investigate
how users can defend themselves against monitoring.
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We conducted this study by measuring the activity of 1,033 swarms across
421 trackers for 36 days over 2 years, collecting over 150GB of BitTorrent traffic.
We note that our aim is to design and test novel monitoring detection techniques,
rather than provide a comprehensive picture of BitTorrent monitoring.
The main contributions of this study are:
– We determine that indirect monitoring is still in use against BitTorrent users
and devise more effective techniques to detect peers engaging in it;
– We find indications that certain entities engage in direct monitoring of Bit-
Torrent users and provide features to detect such peers;
– We also notice that direct monitoring, in its current form, falls short of pro-
viding conclusive evidence of copyright infringement.
1.1 Related Work
A number of studies have focused on measuring and characterising specific prop-
erties of BitTorrent (e.g., [5,7]); other work has introduced improvements to the
measuring process itself (e.g., [24, 26, 27]). The limitations of the evidence col-
lected through indirect monitoring for legal cases motivated Bauer et al. [1] to
design BitStalker, an active probing mechanism for identifying hosts using Bit-
Torrent to download files. Wolchok and Halderman [25] have shown that BitTor-
rent’s distributed hash tables can be quickly crawled to more efficiently monitor
users’ activity. Similarly, Le Blond et al. [12, 13] have demonstrated how proto-
col features can be leveraged for efficient spying on large numbers of BitTorrent
users. While some of the techniques proposed in these papers are related to our
work, our aims are quite different; rather than measuring the behaviour of the
typical BitTorrent user, we wish to determine if and how monitoring is taking
place by measuring the atypical behaviour of monitors.
The issue of detecting and understanding how the indirect monitoring of
users’ activity is performed on BitTorrent has received attention in the past.
In a 2008 study, Piatek et al. [17] provided empirical evidence that enforcement
agencies resort to indirect monitoring for identifying infringing users. They ques-
tioned the robustness of evidence collected via indirect monitoring and presented
attacks that may cause arbitrary network users to be wrongly accused of infringe-
ment. Siganos et al. [20] described a set of network-level features that can be
used for automatically detecting “deviant” clients, some of which are deemed
to be indirect monitors. We revisit the issue of identifying indirect monitors
and introduce a new and novel detection method; we show that our method is
simple to compute and provides more accurate results than those of Siganos et
al. [20] by ruling out false positives due to network address translation (NAT).
We are the first to study whether direct monitoring is used by copyright enforce-
ment agencies to identify file-sharers, and discuss techniques for detecting direct
monitors.
A common approach to BitTorrent monitor evasion is to prevent interac-
tion with peers that are suspected of monitoring at the transport layer (lists of
suspicious peers are often referred to as blocklists). Potharaju et al. [18] offer
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a blocklist generation technique for BitTorrent based on peers’ participation in
multiple swarms sharing the same content, arguing that simultaneously down-
loading multiple copies of the same content is suspicious. The blocklist approach
only prevents direct monitoring and it is only effective if reliable techniques exist
for identifying monitors. We compare our results with the contents of a popular
blocklist and discover a high incidence of false positives and false negatives in
the blocklist we examine.
1.2 Ethical Statement
The tension between BitTorrent users and copyright enforcement agencies is of-
ten described as an arms race [17, 20, 25], in which one side attempts to share
content and the other attempts to monitor and disrupt this activity. As with
previous studies in this area, we do not take a side in this arms race: the re-
sults we present could benefit both users (e.g., by improving the detection and
blocking of monitors) and copyright enforcement agencies (e.g., by improving
monitoring techniques). Furthermore, it has been noted previously [18] that the
monitoring process used by copyright enforcement agencies may wrongly impli-
cate researchers performing experiments in BitTorrent swarms. The features we
present may enable them to design more conservative research experiments or
to better interpret their results.
There are significant privacy concerns when reporting on data collected from
BitTorrent traffic. To protect the privacy of the peers we monitored, we do not
disclose the IP addresses of individual peers, and the peer lists and peer/peer
communication data that were collected during monitoring will be destroyed
when they are no longer required. The web addresses of notable trackers are
revealed, but since they regularly track hundreds of thousands of torrents si-
multaneously, this poses no risk of a privacy violation. We only disclose the
identity of copyright enforcement agencies that have publicly announced that
they are monitoring BitTorrent. Following previous work in this area (e.g., [18]),
we indicate Autonomous Systems (ASes) that appear to host large numbers of
monitors, but we do not disclose individual ranges inside an AS.
Finally, in all of our data collection processes, we were careful not to up-
load or download any shared files; therefore, we have not participated in any
copyright-infringing activity as a result of this study. Piatek et al. [17] delib-
erately implicated innocent network devices (such as printers and routers) in
file-sharing to draw unsubstantiated cease-and-desist letters from copyright en-
forcement agencies; since their study was designed to highlight the shortcomings
of indirect monitoring, and ours involved communicating directly with other
peers from network devices potentially capable of infringing copyright, we did
not design our study in a way that would intentionally cause us to receive cease-
and-desist letters.
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2 Background
Firstly, we provide an overview of the BitTorrent protocol, emphasising the as-
pects of the protocol that are relevant to our work. We focus on the original
specification of the protocol.
2.1 Protocol Overview and Terminology
The BitTorrent protocol was designed to replace the distribution of large files
via other, less efficient protocols, such as HTTP and FTP.
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Fig. 2. A file being shared using BitTorrent.
Figure 2 summarises how a file is shared using BitTorrent. The user holding
the file creates a torrent file containing metadata about the shared file. The
shared file is described in terms of smaller pieces, which are divided further
into blocks. When concatenated, the pieces produce the original shared file. The
torrent file also contains the URL of a tracker, a centralised server that tracks
which peers are downloading and uploading the shared file. A SHA-1 hash —
the torrent’s infohash — is used in all subsequent peer/tracker communication
to uniquely identify this torrent. The torrent file can then be published (e.g., on
a web server).
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Users interested in the shared file download the torrent file and report their
presence to the tracker by announcing to it — thus they become peers, and join
the collective swarm of peers uploading and downloading pieces of the shared
file. The tracker responds with a list of up to 200 IP addresses and port numbers
of other peers in the swarm. Peers that hold a complete copy of the file are
seeders, and those that do not are leechers.
Peers contact other peers in the swarm using the list of IP addresses given
to them by the tracker. They exchange information about which pieces of the
shared file they have, and may announce their interest in particular pieces held
by the remote peer. The remote peer may then agree to send a particular piece to
the peer. When a peer holds every piece, it can reconstruct a copy of the original
file. It becomes a seeder, whose role is to continue sending pieces to leechers.
Periodically, peers will update the tracker to inform it of their progress on
uploading and downloading the shared file. In return, the tracker responds with
an updated list of peers in the swarm, allowing further new peers to join.
2.2 BitTorrent Protocol Messages
For peer/peer communication, the protocol specifies messages that can be ex-
changed between peers. We concern ourselves with the following relevant mes-
sages:
handshake. Sent immediately after a connection has been established between
two peers; the peer that initiated the connection sends its handshake message
first. Each peer includes a randomly-generated peer ID that the recipient uses
to uniquely identify the sender.
extprotocol. Optionally sent after the handshake message, this message allows
peers to exchange information about which protocol extensions they support.
bitfield. Sent after peers have exchanged handshake messages; the peer that ini-
tiated the connection sends its bitfield message first. The bitfield is a bit mask
representation of the pieces that the sender claims to be holding; e.g., in a 10-
piece torrent, the bitfield 1001010010 indicates that the peer holds pieces 0, 3,
5 and 8.
have. May be sent at any time during a connection’s lifetime. Used to inform
the recipient that the sender now holds a piece that the sender was not holding
when the peers exchanged their bitfields; e.g., if peer PA has the bitfield 1000
stored for peer PB and PB later sends the message have(2), PA can update its
bitfield for PB to 1010.
request. Requests that the recipient send a piece (or a block of a piece) that it
has previously advertised.
piece. Contains the piece data that was requested by the recipient in an earlier
request message.
keepalive. Idle peer/peer connections are usually closed after three minutes. This
message is used to ask the recipient not to close the connection as a result of
idleness, as the sender may send further messages later.
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2.3 BitTorrent Indexing
The BitTorrent protocol does not specify how a torrent file should be circulated
to other users interested in downloading the shared file. Consequently, torrent
indexing web sites such as The Pirate Bay [21] were created to facilitate the
organisation and distribution of torrent files. Many of them index copyright-
infringing torrents — in the case of The Pirate Bay, this is its explicit purpose.
The administrators of torrent indexing web sites are often targeted by legal
action initiated by trade organisations representing copyright holders, who claim
that online copyright infringement causes financial disruption to their members’
businesses; these trade organisations have successfully persuaded courts in the
United States, Sweden, Slovenia and other countries to order the closure of
offending web sites and trackers.
3 Detecting Indirect Monitoring
A simple approach for performing indirect monitoring involves announcing to
trackers and collecting the IP addresses of peers returned by the tracker. This
technique offers a fast method of harvesting a large number of peers, but it
has been shown by Piatek et al. [17] that IP address-based peer identification
produces unreliable results. Furthermore, by announcing to trackers, monitors
leave a trace of their presence: their IP addresses also appear in peer lists. We
can then indirectly observe the behaviour of peers to identify differences between
regular peers and monitors.
To motivate our subsequent work on direct monitoring, we first reassess tech-
niques previously proposed to identify indirect monitors, and propose an addi-
tional novel feature for identifying them.
3.1 Methodology and Data Collection
To automatically collect information from BitTorrent trackers, we created our
own indirect monitoring client that gathers newly-published torrent files from
the Top 100 in each category on The Pirate Bay, and continually contacts each
of the trackers and stores (IP address, port number, infohash, time) tuples from
the peer lists that are returned; it then attempts to establish a TCP connection
with each host and sends a handshakemessage to ensure that the host is in fact a
BitTorrent peer. The monitor also requests from trackers the number of seeders
and leechers in each swarm.
We collected data from July 21–28, 2009, routing our traffic through the Tor
anonymity network [23]. This led to an excessive number of connections timing
out or being dropped, so we collected data again without using Tor from August
4–6, 2009. A summary of data collected is presented in Table 1. The comparative
success of the second trace when compared with the first seems to be entirely
due to the poor performance of Tor.
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Table 1. A summary of indirect monitoring activity.
Jul 21–28, 2009 Aug 4–6, 2009
IP addresses seen 831,039 1,351,853
(IP, port) pairs seen 894,529 1,498,015
Torrents monitored 967 690
Trackers seen 196 181
3.2 Features for Detecting Monitors
Using this data we build profiles for the behaviour of BitTorrent clients, which
we can use to differentiate regular peers from monitors. The assumption is that
“anomalous” profiles may be indicative of the behaviour of monitors. To build
such profiles, we first consider five features that have been previously proposed
in the literature:
1. The proportion of a subnet that has been seen in BitTorrent swarms. Mon-
itoring agencies may use a large proportion of their subnet for monitoring.
2. The length of time a peer spends in a swarm. Monitors may spend more
time in the swarm than regular file-sharers.
3. The number of different (IP, port, infohash) combinations per IP address.
Monitoring agencies may operate many clients from a single IP address.
4. Whether a peer reported by a tracker accepts incoming connections. Moni-
tors may block all incoming connection attempts.
5. The number of swarms in which IP addresses from a particular subnet ap-
pear. Monitoring agencies may monitor many torrents from their subnet.
Features 1–4 have been suggested by Siganos et al. [20] and Piatek et al. [17],
and feature 5 by Potharaju et al. [18]. Potharaju et al. also leverage web search
engines to derive a database of the content being shared by each torrent, and look
for peers that download multiple copies of the same content. Another potentially
useful but untested feature is whether a peer is downloading content that is likely
to appeal to very different audiences (e.g., a peer that downloads both classical
and pop music tracks). We do not consider either of these features, as they
cannot be calculated from information provided by trackers alone.
While investigating feature 4, we found that only 16% of peers in our datasets
accepted incoming connections. Given the commonness of this behaviour, we
conclude that the typical behaviour of a BitTorrent client is to reject incoming
connection requests. This is likely due to BitTorrent users being affected by
incorrectly-configured residential routers or firewalls. We show in Section 4 that
many monitors do accept incoming connections, therefore we do not use this
feature for detecting monitors.
Our heuristic for detecting monitors relies on the remaining four features.
More precisely, we consider a peer likely to be a monitor if it appears in the top
first percentile for each of the features (i.e., the highest number of connections,
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the longest connection time, etc.); by applying this test we found 1,139 IP ad-
dresses that were in the top first percentile for all four features. To understand
whether these features are effective at identifying monitors, we manually anal-
ysed these anomalies; they included IP addresses assigned to a company named
Checktor [3], which offers commercial BitTorrent monitoring services, and 16 ad-
dresses assigned to a medium-sized computer security consultancy company that
does not publicly acknowledge monitoring BitTorrent. Another subnet, which we
saw in over 500 swarms, belongs to a company that advertises itself as providing
“intellectual property advice”, but does not specifically acknowledge monitor-
ing BitTorrent. We also found two subnets assigned to hosting companies, one
with IP addresses in 433 swarms and the other with IP addresses in 371 swarms.
These hosting companies advertise themselves as providers of Internet services to
businesses, rather than residential users, where BitTorrent traffic is more likely
to be regulated. We speculate that copyright enforcement companies are using
these hosting companies as a front to disguise their identities. We also identified
a number of IP addresses allocated to large ISPs, such as Vodafone, Etisalat and
SingNet. These ISPs have all been assigned very small subnets and therefore use
NAT. Some of the 1,139 also seemed to be very active users on residential ISPs
that were seeding a large number of files; while unusual, there was nothing to
suggest that these peers were engaged in monitoring.
3.3 A Novel Feature
When comparing the profiles of suspicious peers that appeared to be monitoring
with those that appeared to be subject to NAT, we noticed that the suspicious
peers had multiple (IP, port) pairs in a number of different swarms. According
to the BitTorrent protocol, a client should open a different port for each swarm
that it joins; therefore, this behaviour is not expected from regular peers. While
it would be possible for an (IP, port) pair to appear in more than one swarm, this
should only happen when a peer has just left one swarm and joined another. The
instances of peers in different swarms from ISPs that made heavy use of NAT,
such as Vodafone and Etisalat, all had unique (IP, port) pairs. This observation
led us to a new, sixth feature for identifying peers likely engaged in monitoring:
6. The number of times the same (IP, port) pair is observed concurrently in
different swarms.
We considered any (IP, port) pair that appeared in four or more swarms to
be suspicious. This feature found IP addresses assigned to Peer Media Technolo-
gies [16] (a well-known copyright enforcement agency) monitoring seven Harry
Potter ebook and movie torrents, and the INRIA research institution [10], which
had been overlooked by features 1–5 because so few torrents were being moni-
tored, and because a very small proportion of INRIA’s subnet was being used
for monitoring. While we were collecting our data, INRIA did not publicly ac-
knowledge monitoring BitTorrent; however, researchers there have since pub-
lished work describing the detection of initial seeders of files [13].
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3.4 Discussion
These results continue a line of work by Piatek et al. [17], Siganos et al. [20] and
Potharaju et al. [18], who show that indirect monitoring of BitTorrent is occur-
ring and can be detected by profiling specific characteristics of peers’ behaviour.
The stopped message. The BitTorrent protocol allows a peer to send a stopped
message in the announce to the tracker to inform it that the peer is leaving the
swarm. The tracker should then remove the peer’s IP address from its peer list. If
a tracker correctly implements this rule of the protocol, an indirect monitor can
send the message immediately after receiving a peer list and thus make itself
undetectable. We tested a number of trackers’ support for this message and
while some trackers removed the IP address immediately, those operated by The
Pirate Bay did not. By requesting from the tracker the number of completed
downloads for each torrent, we found that The Pirate Bay balanced tracker
load across six servers; it therefore seems probable that the two announces were
being processed by different servers, which explains why peer IP addresses are
not always removed from peer lists.
False positives and negatives. We note that, as a normal user of BitTorrent
could be said to be “monitoring” the peers it connects to, it would be possible
for a monitor to avoid detection by any set of features that tries to distinguish
monitors from a regular peer. A monitoring client could avoid detection by our
new feature by selecting a different port for each torrent, and monitoring agencies
could use many different subnets and limit the amount of time that each IP
address was used. This would make monitoring a much more expensive and
time-consuming process, so while we cannot guarantee the detection of a monitor
that deliberately tries to obscure its activities, we can detect monitors that try
to maximise the number of file-sharers they find.
The suspicious behaviour we detected from the IP addresses of companies
that acknowledge that they monitor BitTorrent (such as Checktor), and our
detection of the INRIA monitors before they released their publication, does
provide some ground truth to validate our methods. Inspecting our suspected
monitors by hand, we found no results that appeared to be false positives (al-
though we cannot absolutely rule out results that may be due to network be-
haviour we are unaware of). This suggests that our false positive rate is low.
Inspecting a sample of the negative results, we did not find any that appeared
to be monitors, although, for the reasons given above, it is harder for us to rule
out false negatives.
We can make accurate comparisons between sets of features. Comparing the
methods of Siganos et al., Piatek et al. and Potharaju et al. with our own, we
found that they incorrectly identified IP addresses allocated to ISPs which make
heavy use of NAT, such as Vodafone, Etisalat and SingNet. They also missed
some of the smaller monitoring agencies such as Peer Media Technologies and
INRIA. We can therefore be confident that the addition of our new feature
decreases the false negative and false positive rate.
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4 Detecting Direct Monitoring
Direct monitoring, in which monitors directly contact and probe other peers, was
proposed by Bauer et al. as a method of improving the accuracy of file-sharing
evidence collected by monitors [1]. However, it has not been shown conclusively
that direct monitoring is being employed widely by copyright enforcement com-
panies.
A direct monitor may operate actively (by announcing to the tracker, receiv-
ing peer lists and initiating outgoing connections to other peers), or passively (by
placing itself into a swarm and listening for incoming connections only). Passive
monitoring has the advantage of detecting peers using NAT and others that
do not accept incoming connections; active monitoring can be performed more
quickly and thus can monitor more peers across the same period. Initiating and
listening for direct connections takes much longer than harvesting IP addresses
from a tracker, so we concentrate on features that can be calculated without
monitoring a large number of swarms.
4.1 Methodology and Data Collection
We created a number of customised BitTorrent clients, inserted them into swarms
and observed their behaviour. Every protocol-compliant message sent to our
clients was logged along with the timestamp, the message’s payload, and the
peer’s IP address, port number and peer ID. As a side-effect of joining swarms,
our clients regularly received peer lists from trackers after announcing to them,
which we also stored for later use.
Table 2. A summary of direct monitoring activity.
Aug 10–23, 2010 Feb 9–18, 2011 May 3–8, 2011
IP addresses seen 311,549 112,584 98,385
(IP, port) pairs seen 2,441,555 371,572 321,949
Torrents monitored 30 20 16
Trackers seen 20 12 12
We created two classes of clients: one designed to communicate with passive
direct monitors (by harvesting peer lists and attempting to connect to each
peer systematically), and another designed to communicate with active direct
monitors (by joining the swarm and only listening for incoming connections).
Since it is possible for monitors to engage in either or both forms of direct
monitoring, this allowed us to determine which (if any) form is being used most
frequently.
Our clients used three different bitfield-reporting strategies to detect dis-
crepancies between the bitfields reported by other peers, so a peer intentionally
misreporting its own bitfield would be noticeable:
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Mirror strategy. Designed to appear as uninteresting as possible to other peers:
reports to connecting clients that it holds the same pieces as the connecting
client (by “mirroring” the client’s bitfield and have messages back to them), does
not send request messages for pieces of the shared file, and does not respond to
request or piece messages.
Empty strategy. Appears to have joined the swarm recently: per the mirror strat-
egy, but always reports an empty bitfield and does not mirror have messages.
Full strategy. Appears to be a seeder: per the mirror strategy, but always reports
a full bitfield and does not mirror have messages.
Two groups of swarms were monitored: 6 sharing public domain files, and
60 sharing copyright-infringing files. Public domain torrents were sourced from
ClearBits [4] and LinuxTracker [14]. Copyright-infringing torrents were selected
from a range of categories on The Pirate Bay, including music, movies, TV shows,
music videos and software. Torrents were selected from both within and outside
of the Top 100. Table 2 summarises the data we collected.
4.2 Features for Detecting Monitors
We identify two features for distinguishing peers likely to be performing active
monitoring:
Reported completion. Since our clients logged all bitfieldmessages, and most peers
reconnected to our monitors, we could compare the bitfields the clients were sent
and track their progression over time. Although the majority of peers reported
steady progression towards completing the download, peers in 20 small subnets
always reported completions of between 45% and 55%. For these IP addresses,
further inspection of the bitfields showed no consistency: they appeared to be
generated randomly, rather than reflecting a progressively completing download
(compare Figures 3 and 4: black blocks indicate pieces of the file that a peer
claims to have; white blocks are missing pieces). A peer that reports a piece as
not downloaded when it had previously reported it as downloaded is lying about
the parts of the shared file it is holding, and is therefore likely to be a monitor.
Connection frequency. It is common for peers to reconnect to peers they have
discovered previously to check whether they are advertising new pieces that the
peer still needs to download. Most peers connected to our clients over a 40-
hour period during the entire monitoring period. However, 0.05% of the peer
population, scattered across a low number of small subnets, connected to our
monitors over a much longer 133-hour period; all of these peers were also detected
by the “reported completion” feature. This is indicative of a group of peers more
interested in analysing the download progress made by other peers rather than
making any download progress of their own, and is another strong feature for
identifying monitors.
Peers detected using these features superficially appeared to be active, but
in fact they were not downloading the shared file; their IP addresses belong to
subnets of three hosting companies. We can be sure that each connection was
from the same BitTorrent client due to the unique peer ID in the handshake.
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time
Fig. 3. The download progression of a regular peer. Its bitfield steadily progresses
toward completion.
time
Fig. 4. The download progression of a monitoring peer. Its bitfield changes randomly
over time.
This behaviour was not observed in any of the swarms sharing public domain
content; the most likely explanation is that these were monitors. Notably, they
did not request any pieces of the shared file after connecting, so it is questionable
whether a copyright enforcement agency employing this technique could prove
that other peers in the swarm were really sharing the file. We note that monitors
could avoid detection by our “reported completion” feature by simulating a
realistic bitfield over time, but establishing connections with other peers and
then reporting a complete bitfield would be highly suspicious; additionally, as
we could distribute monitors over several subnets, monitors could only avoid
our “connection frequency” feature by making fewer connections, reducing their
effectiveness.
We also experimented with several ineffective features; we briefly discuss
them here, for the sake of completeness and to aid future research into direct
monitoring:
Duration of connection. The protocol states that idle connections should be
closed after 3 minutes to aid resource conservation. Peers may send keepalive
messages to other peers to indicate that they wish to communicate again soon
(e.g., to request a piece), and therefore want the connection to be kept alive. As
there is no incentive for other peers to remain connected to our “mirror” and
“empty” clients, it is expected that peers should spend little time connected to
them, and conversely spend more time connected to our “full” clients; this was
indeed the case, and we found no evidence that certain peers were deliberately
keeping connections alive for monitoring purposes.
Protocol violations. All peers are expected to obey the protocol; e.g., if a peer
advertises the availability of a piece, it should not request that piece in a future
message. Similarly, a peer should not attempt to send a piece to another peer
unless the receiving peer has explicitly requested it. Although we found no ev-
idence that protocol violations indicate the presence of a monitor, instances of
14 Chothia et al.
protocol violation were observed from 4 IP addresses assigned to ISPs known
to use NAT, indicating that this may instead be another suitable feature for
identifying peers being subjected to NAT or firewalling.
Number of request messages sent. Since BitTorrent is a file-sharing protocol, it
follows that peers should be expected to request pieces of the shared file from oth-
ers; peers that do not request pieces of the file may therefore be participating in
the swarm for reasons other than file-sharing (e.g., monitoring). However, a large
proportion of peers (over 99.9%) connected to our clients without ever sending a
request message for a piece of the file the clients were offering, and subsequently
showed progress in downloading the file in future connections; therefore, this is
an unlikely feature for detecting monitors.
4.3 Discussion
Table 3. ASes suspected of engaging in direct monitoring.
Number of Monitors AS Name
467 23504 Speakeasy, Inc.
202 174 Cogent/PSI
114 209 Qwest LLC
39 558 Net2EZ
17 27699 TELESP
17 1213 HEAnet Ltd
ASes involved in monitoring. Based on the features we identify, we suspect
six ASes of harbouring a total of 856 peers engaging in direct monitoring (see
Table 3). Two of these ASes (AS558 and AS1213) have previously been identi-
fied in the study by Potharaju et al. [18] as potential harbourers of monitoring
agencies; we suspect a further four. AS209 was considerably more active in 2010
than in 2011; it may be that this AS was once being used by monitoring agencies,
but no longer is.
Incidence of monitoring on The Pirate Bay. Our features only detected
monitors in Top 100 torrents; this implies that copyright enforcement agencies
are monitoring only the most popular content on public trackers. Movie and mu-
sic torrents were most heavily monitored (by 65 and 26 monitors respectively),
particularly by AS23504 and AS558; the other categories were less heavily mon-
itored, although between 1 and 7 IP addresses suspected of monitoring were still
present in each category.
The use of active vs. passive direct monitoring. All of the potential
monitors we have identified engaged in active direct monitoring: our clients were
unable to establish outgoing connections to them. This is understandable, as
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monitors are able to communicate with many more peers (and therefore detect
a larger number of downloaders) by harvesting peer lists and processing them
systematically, as opposed to simply waiting for incoming connections for other
peers.
Average time before monitors connect. 40% of the monitors that commu-
nicated with our clients made their initial connection within 3 hours of the client
joining the swarm; the slowest monitor took 33 hours to make its first connection.
The average time decreases for torrents appearing higher in the Top 100, imply-
ing that enforcement agencies allocate resources according to the popularity of
the content they monitor.
Proportion of peers accepting incoming connections. The results of our
2009 study revealed that outgoing connections could only be made to 16% of
peers. This fell to 7% in 2011. Since monitors currently engage in active direct
monitoring only, peers may still be able to participate in a swarm undetected
by enforcement agencies, who rely solely on a peer’s ability to accept incoming
connections in order to communicate with them.
False positives and negatives. As with indirect monitoring, the rate of false
negatives is difficult to quantify, because a monitor can arbitrarily behave like
a regular peer. However, this comes at the cost of a far-reduced monitoring
capability. The more measures a monitor takes to increase its efficiency and
coverage, the more easily it can be detected. As for false positives, the suspected
monitors we found showed a highly irregular download progression (as shown in
Figure 4); it is impossible for a peer sharing content to behave in this way, so we
can be sure that they were not regular file-sharers. While we cannot be certain
that they were monitors, it seems highly likely.
Some BitTorrent clients are known to deliberately misreport their bitfields
when seeding, ostensibly to evade ISPs’ traffic management policies that penalise
BitTorrent seeders [22]: rather than sending a complete bitfield, these clients
send a partially-complete bitfield and then immediately complete it with have
messages for the pieces that were omitted (a technique named “lazy bitfield”);
we note that this behaviour is now widespread among BitTorrent clients. Our
customised clients eliminate this potential source of false positives by grouping
the pieces advertised in a client’s bitfield message with those advertised in have
messages received in the subsequent 30 seconds as if they had all been advertised
in the initial bitfield message.
To corroborate the potential sources of suspicious behaviour we had detected,
we compared our results with the contents of public blocklists. These are lists
of peers suspected of being involved in suspicious activity, and are typically
created through manual analysis by a community of concerned users. We use
such lists as a baseline for comparing our results and, in particular, for gaining
an understanding of potential false positives and false negatives. More precisely,
we used the Anti-Infringement blocklist available from I-BlockList [9], as it is
popular among BitTorrent users.
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As a preliminary step, we assessed the accuracy of the Anti-Infringement list
by measuring the number of false positives it contained (i.e., the number of listed
peers that are unlikely to engage in monitoring activity). To do so, we leveraged
the observation that enforcement agencies have no incentive to monitor public
domain torrents. Therefore, we consider an entry in the blocklist to be a false
positive if we find a peer in the subnet engaged in the download of public domain
torrents. During 27 days of monitoring, we found 5 false positives in the blocklist
(out of 2,880 total subnets), and discarded them from the rest of this analysis.
We considered the remaining 2,875 to be true positives (i.e., subnets that could
contain monitoring peers).
Our direct monitoring analysis produced 593 peers (out of 856) that appear
in subnets listed in the Anti-Infringement list. This represents a 69% overlap
between our results and the contents of the list; therefore, the majority of our
results are corroborated by the results of independent blocklists. In addition,
our analysis identifies 263 peers (31% of our results) that, albeit displaying the
same behaviour as monitoring peers (as determined by our detection features),
do not currently appear in blocklists. We consider this a strong indication that
these results are true positives of our analysis that are not detected by (manual)
blocklisting techniques; BitTorrent users should therefore not rely solely on such
speculative blocklists to protect their privacy, and should instead combine them
with blocklists based on empirical research, such as those generated by Potharaju
et al. [18], to reduce the number of false negatives encountered.
Finally, we measured the number of subnets in the Anti-Infringement list
that were observed during direct monitoring and were not detected by our tech-
niques; we consider peers in these subnets to be potential false negatives of our
analysis that warrant further examination. We found 57 such peers. There are
several reasons that these peers might not have been detected by our features: 53
disconnected from our monitoring clients at unexpected times, indicating pos-
sible network connectivity problems or malfunctioning BitTorrent clients. The
remaining 4 used IP addresses whose ISPs are known to use NAT, potentially
limiting their ability to communicate properly with our monitoring clients; these
peers showed no signs of engaging in suspicious activity, so we suspect that their
subnets were mistakenly added to the blocklist.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the current state of BitTorrent monitoring. We in-
troduced several novel techniques for identifying peers that perform monitoring
and validated them on large datasets. We determined that copyright enforcement
agencies use indirect monitoring (confirming the results of earlier studies) as well
as direct monitoring (a novel contribution of our work) to determine users’ ac-
tivity. From our experiments, we derived a number of interesting properties of
monitoring, as it is currently performed: e.g., that monitoring is prevalent for
popular content (i.e., the most popular torrents on The Pirate Bay) but ab-
sent for less popular content, and that peers sharing popular content are likely
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to be monitored within three hours of joining a swarm. Finally, we found that
publicly-available blocklists, used by privacy-conscious BitTorrent users to pre-
vent contact with monitors, contain large incidences of false positives and false
negatives, and recommended that blocklists based on empirical research [18] are
used over speculative ones.
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